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_posts/2017-03-30-law-is-better-without-monopoly.md

@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ Characteristic of customary legal systems such as the [early Irish law](https://
 
 Few would pay 50,000€ a year out of their own pocket to keep an offender in prison, when he could be made to follow a compensation plan instead. If you commit a crime, your tribe would likely compensate the victim and collect the debt from you, as going to war with another tribe over it wouldn't be worth it. If you refuse to pay, your tribe might disown you. You would become an outlaw and might need to go into hiding, essentially isolating yourself at your own cost.
 
-What if the tribes disagree? Well, governments these days disagree all the time and international justice is a mess. Still, they don't go to war over small things — even if they could do so with taxpayers' money. In case of voluntaristic tribes that people are free to leave without moving to another country, there is even less incentive to go to war or leave disputes unresolved. Members will go elsewhere if the price gets too high or the service too bad. Tribes must co-operate and follow the common law, or else they will face external pressure and increased costs.
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 Victimless crimes would generally not exist. War on drugs would not happen without a law monopoly — physically attacking others because of their personal choices would be a fatal mistake without taxpayers’ money and the overwhelming force of a law monopoly to back it up.
 
 **How would a modern society without a law monopolist look like in practice?** The opposite of monopolistic law is [polycentric law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polycentric_law): multiple providers of legal protection and other “government” services within the same area. They could be a mixture of tribes, mutual insurance pools, for-profit companies or social networks organized in some way we cannot even imagine yet — whatever works best and suits individual preferences. Essentially, they would be groups of people that come together, pay some kind of insurance money or have a commitment to participate in their operations, and have processes for handling internal and external disputes and protect their members.
@@ -28,6 +26,8 @@ If you were unhappy with your “government”, you could change it at will, jus
 
 Law and protection providers would have the natural incentive to focus on proactive crime prevention rather than just dealing with the damage. They would likely want to help you with security planning and offer discounts for doing it. Customer experience would be massively better than what we have now — providers would actually have to care about keeping their customers.
 
+What if there's a legal dispute between providers? Well, governments these days disagree all the time and international justice is a mess. Still, they don't go to war over small things — even if they could do so with taxpayers' money. In case of voluntaristic providers that people are free to leave without moving to another country, there is even less incentive to go to war or leave "international" disputes unresolved. Members will go elsewhere if the price gets too high or the service too bad. Providers must co-operate and follow the common law, or else they will face external pressure and increased costs.
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 **How do we get there?** Through technological advancements that make old-style governments obsolete. We will have decentralized and voluntary alternatives that outcompete stagnant government services. When we have better alternatives for education, healthcare, social security, money, [reputation systems](https://siriusbusiness.fi/learning-to-trust-strangers), dispute resolution, personal registry, ownership registry and personal safety, governments lose their justification and legitimacy.
 
 When the framework of governments and banks is not needed to run companies, organize work and property or move money, taxation without consent becomes increasingly difficult and government monopolies become even less justified.